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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 




This matter is before this court on an appeal by Esther 
and William Bein from an order of the district court entered 
August 18, 1999, denying their motion to amend or alter an 
order entered July 9, 1999, denying in part their motion 
pursuant to Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure for return of property. The Beins, alleging the 
Government wrongfully had destroyed or failed to return 
their property, filed their Rule 41(e) motion to recover 
compensatory damages or the return of the property. The 
district court granted the motion in part, awarding damages 
in the amount of $2,450, and ordering the Government to 
return a cart in its possession. The court, however, denied 
the Beins' motion with respect to their claim for losses of 
other property. The Beins appeal, seeking additional 
damages. 
 
Although the Government has not appealed, it asserts, as 
it did in the district court, that the court did not have 
jurisdiction to entertain the Beins' Rule 41(e) motion to the 
extent that it sought compensatory damages. Because we 
find that sovereign immunity bars a claim against the 
Government seeking money damages under Rule 41(e), we 
will vacate the order of the district court entered July 9, 
1999, insofar as it awarded damages. We do not, however, 
disturb the order with respect to the return of the cart. 
Inasmuch as the district court did not have jurisdiction to 
award damages, we do not consider on the merits the 
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arguments the Beins raise as they advance them only in an 
attempt to recover additional damages. Thus, we will affirm 
the order of August 18, 1999, denying the Beins' motion to 
amend the order of July 9, 1999. 
 
This matter arises out of the investigation and arrest of 
the Beins and their subsequent prosecution in the district 
court. On October 3, 1994, agents of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation arrested the Beins who then were charged 
with conspiracy and interstate transportation of stolen 
merchandise. Following the filing of a superseding 
indictment, the Beins pleaded guilty to conspiracy to 
commit interstate transportation of stolen property and 
conspiracy to launder money. 
 
At the time of the Beins' arrest, the Government executed 
search warrants at their home and at their wholesale 
toiletries and pharmaceutical products business. 1 The 
Government maintained an inventory of all items that were 
seized. See app. at 9-25. At the Beins' sentencing hearing, 
the court directed the Government to return all non- 
contraband items to the Beins. 
 
There is no dispute that the Government returned certain 
items to the Beins. Nevertheless, the Beins filed their 
motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(e) as they asserted 
that the Government did not return many items seized and 
instead destroyed them. Consequently, in their Rule 41(e) 
motion the Beins largely sought to recover monetary 
damages to compensate them for their loss. Indeed, the 
Beins acknowledge that the Government told them before 
they filed their Rule 41(e) motion that the property it had 
not returned had been destroyed. 
 
The Beins alleged in particular that the Government 
improperly had destroyed (1) documentation of goods sold 
to certain entities, (2) gemachs,2 (3) certain warehouse 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. FBI, Internal Revenue Service agents and a number of local police 
officers who were deputized as United States Marshals executed the 
warrants as part of an investigation called Operation "Fence Fry." The 
Pittsburgh Police Department placed the goods seized from the Beins in 
a forfeiture lot it maintained. The IRS stored all documents seized. 
 
2. A gemach is a promissory note representing a loan made to a 
charitable organization. The loan is repaid at an agreed upon date by 
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merchandise, (4) six carts, (5) photographs, (6) keys, (7) 
memorabilia, (8) two briefcases, (9) documents related to a 
particular lawsuit, (10) computer programs, (11) an airline 
ticket, (12) certain important papers and invitations, (13) a 
fax machine, and (14) documents relating to the repair of a 
property in Canada the Beins owned. As we have indicated, 
the district court determined that the Government retained 
in its possession one of the six carts for which the Beins 
sought damages and ordered its return, a matter not in 
issue on this appeal. The court further determined that the 
Government wrongfully had destroyed five carts, the keys, 
a fax machine and wedding and bar mitzvah invitations. 
Inamsuch as the Government could not return these items, 
the court awarded the Beins $2,450 in damages to 
compensate them for their loss. The district court found, 
however, that the Beins had not established that the 
Government took possession of the remaining property or 
had not presented adequate proof of damages for its loss. 
The Beins have appealed from the order of the district court 
to the extent it denied their Rule 41(e) motion seeking 
damages for this remaining property. We have jurisdiction 




It is well settled that the Government may seize evidence 
for use in investigation and trial, but that it must return 
the property once the criminal proceedings have concluded, 
unless it is contraband or subject to forfeiture. See United 
States v. Chambers, 192 F.3d 374, 376 (3d Cir. 1999); see 
also United States v. Premises Known as 608 Taylor Ave., 
Apartment 302, 584 F.2d 1297, 1302 (3d Cir. 1978); United 
States v. Wilson, 540 F.2d 1100, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1976) 
(district court has both the jurisdiction and duty to return 
property against which no government claim lies). A person 
aggrieved by the deprivation of property may file a motion 
under Rule 41(e) to request its return. See Chambers, 192 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
either the borrower or a third party making payment on behalf of the 
borrower. The gemach is considered under Orthodox Jewish Law to be 
a high form of charity because the repayment relieves the recipient of 
any feeling of obligation to the donor. See App. at 231-35. 
 
                                4 
  
F.3d at 376; Government of Virgin Islands v. Edwards, 903 
F.2d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 1990). A district court has 
jurisdiction to entertain a motion for return of property 
even after the termination of criminal proceedings against 
the defendant and such an action is treated as a civil 
proceeding for equitable relief. See United States v. McGlory, 
202 F.3d 664, 670 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc); Chambers, 192 
F.3d at 376-77 (citing United States v. Martinson, 809 F.2d 
1364 (9th Cir. 1987); Rufu v. United States, 20 F.3d 63, 65 
(2d Cir. 1994); Thompson v. Covington, 47 F.3d 974, 975 
(8th Cir. 1995)). Further, even if it is alleged that the 
property the movant seeks to have returned is no longer 
within the Government's possession, the district court has 
jurisdiction to determine whether such property had been 
in its possession and whether it wrongfully disposed of 
such property. See Chambers, 192 F.3d at 378. 
 
The Beins filed their Rule 41(e) motion primarily seeking 
not the return of their property, but rather compensatory 
damages for property they alleged the Government 
wrongfully destroyed. The Government asserts the district 
court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to address 
such a claim under Rule 41(e).3 For the reasons set forth 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The Government also asserts that the Beins' appeal was not timely. 
See Appellee Br. at 1-3. The Government argues that, because Rule 41(e) 
is a rule of criminal procedure, the time for appeal should be ten days, 
as opposed to the 60 days that would be allowed for a civil appeal in a 
case in which it is a party. See id. As noted by the Government, those 
courts that have addressed the issue have held that because Rule 41(e) 
motions filed after the conclusion of criminal proceedings are treated as 
civil proceedings in equity, the time period forfiling a notice of appeal 
in 
civil cases should be applied for the sake of simplicity and clarity. See 
id. 
at 3 (citing United States v. Madden, 95 F.3d 38, 39 n.1 (10th Cir. 1996); 
United States v. Garcia, 65 F.3d 17, 18 n.2 (4th Cir. 1995); Hunt v. U.S. 
Dep't of Justice, 2 F.3d 96 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Taylor, 975 
F.2d 402, 403 (7th Cir. 1992); Martinson, 809 F.2d at 1367). While we 
have not addressed this issue, we do not find any compelling reason to 
part from the consensus that appears to have arisen among those courts 
that have done so. Accordingly, we find that the time for appeal 
applicable to civil actions should apply in the context of an appeal from 
a post-conviction decision on a Rule 41(e) motion and thus, as the Beins 
appealed within 60 days of August 18, 1999, their appeal is timely. Of 
course, we do not consider whether a Rule 41(e) motion made during the 
pendency of the criminal proceedings should be treated as a civil 
proceeding for purposes of calculating the time for appeal as that issue 
is not before us. 
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below, we find that, as a result of the Government's 
immunity from suit, the district court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction over the Beins' claims for monetary damages. 
 
While the Government has not appealed from the order 
entered in the district court, it asserts that, based upon its 
sovereign immunity, the district court did not have 
jurisdiction to enter a claim for monetary damages as relief 
on a Rule 41(e) motion. See Appellee Br. at 4-6. But the 
Government need not have appealed formally from the 
order of the district court for us to consider this issue as a 
claim of sovereign immunity advances a jurisdictional bar 
which a party may raise at any time, even on appeal, and 
which the court may raise sua sponte. See Brown v. 
Secretary of the Army, 78 F.3d 645, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1996); 
see also United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty 
Co., 309 U.S. 506, 514, 60 S.Ct. 653, 657 (1940) ("Consent 
alone gives jurisdiction to adjudicate against a sovereign. 
Absent that consent, the attempted exercise of judicial 
power is void."). 
 
It is a fundamental principle of sovereign immunity that 
federal courts do not have jurisdiction over suits against 
the United States unless Congress, via a statute, expressly 
and unequivocally waives the United States' immunity to 
suit. See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212, 103 
S.Ct. 2961, 2965 (1983). Moreover, when the Government 
does consent to be sued, "the terms of [the] waiver of 
sovereign immunity define the extent of the court's 
jurisdiction." United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834, 841, 
106 S.Ct. 2224, 2229 (1986). "[W]aivers of the 
Government's sovereign immunity, to be effective, must be 
`unequivocally expressed,' " and any such waiver must be 
construed strictly in favor of the sovereign. United States v. 
Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33-34, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 
1014-15 (1992). 
 
As we have indicated, we are concerned with Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 41(e) which reads: 
 
       Motion for Return of Property. A person aggrieved by 
       an unlawful search and seizure or by the deprivation of 
       property may move the district court for the district in 
       which the property was seized for the return of the 
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       property on the ground that such person is entitled to 
       lawful possession of the property. The court shall 
       receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the 
       decision of the motion. If the motion is granted, the 
       property shall be returned to the movant, although 
       reasonable conditions may be imposed to protect 
       access and use of the property in subsequent 
       proceedings. If a motion for return of property is made 
       or comes on for hearing in the district of trial after an 
       indictment or information is filed, it shall be treated 
       also as a motion to suppress under Rule 12. 
 
Inasmuch as Rule 41(e) motions are treated as civil 
equitable actions, see n.3, supra, in light of its equitable 
powers the district court concluded that it had ancillary 
jurisdiction to award damages to the Beins and against the 
United States. 
 
Unquestionably the district court had reason to believe 
that it could award damages as some courts have 
suggested that a court under Rule 41(e) "has power to 
award damages incident to the complaint." United States v. 
Martinson, 809 F.2d at 1367- 68; see also United States v. 
Kanasco, Ltd., 123 F.3d 209, 210 n.1 (4th Cir. 1997); Mora 
v. United States, 955 F.2d 156, 159-60 (2d Cir. 1992). 
Other courts, however, have disagreed with this approach. 
See, e.g., Pena v. United States, 157 F.3d 984, 986 (5th Cir. 
1998); United States v. Chambers, __ F. Supp.2d __, 2000 
WL 369786, at *3-6 (D.N.J. Apr. 5, 2000). We seem never 
to have made a definitive ruling on the point and thus we 
make our own analysis of the issue. 
 
Sovereign immunity protects the Government from suit 
except insofar as it has waived that immunity. A waiver 
must be expressed unequivocally in statutory text and will 
not be implied. See Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192, 116 
S.Ct. 2092, 2096 (1996) (citations omitted). Rule 41(e), 
however, does not expressly authorize an award of 
monetary damages and thus a court's jurisdiction to award 
damages pursuant to that rule is questionable. 
 
Notwithstanding the absence of an express provision in 
Rule 41(e) authorizing an award of damages, the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has stated that this omission 
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is not controlling with respect to the availability of damages 
under that rule. Thus, in Martinson it indicated: 
 
       When a citizen has invoked the jurisdiction of a court 
       by moving for return of his property, we do not think 
       that the government should be able to destroy 
       jurisdiction by its own conduct. The government 
       should not at one stroke be able to deprive a citizen of 
       a remedy and render powerless the court that could 
       grant the remedy. 
 
Martinson, 809 F.2d at 1368. The court feared that if it 
allowed the Government to moot a motion for return of 
property by giving the property away or destroying it, it 
would be encouraging the United States to undertake 
unilateral actions which would have the effect of 
circumventing the judicial process. See id. While we respect 
this policy argument, it overlooks the fact that a 
determination of whether Rule 41(e) authorizes an award of 
damages raises a question not of mootness, but of 
jurisdiction. Moreover, application of sovereign immunity, 
by its very nature, will leave a person wronged by 
Government conduct without recourse. 
 
Indeed, a more recent decision of the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit appears to be contrary to its reasoning in 
Martinson to the extent it held that a district court has 
jurisdiction to award monetary damages despite the fact 
that Rule 41(e) does not expressly provide for such an 
award. In United States v. Woodley, the court considered 
the question of whether a court could impose a monetary 
sanction on the United States under the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. See 9 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 1993). Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 16(d)(2) provides a court with the authority to 
"prescribe such terms and conditions as are just" to remedy 
a violation of a discovery order. See id. at 782 (quoting Rule 
16(d)(2)). The court found that because Rule 16(d)(2) did 
not include independent authority for a monetary sanction 
it would decline to recognize that the rule waived sovereign 
immunity. Accordingly, the sanction could not be imposed. 
See id. at 781. It seems to us that this conclusion is at 
odds with the result in Martinson. Moreover, Rule 16(d)(2) 
is broader than Rule 41(e) in that Rule 16(d)(2) allows a 
court to prescribe such terms and conditions as are just, 
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whereas Rule 41(e), even though proceedings under it are 
treated as general equitable actions, only provides for one 
express remedy -- the return of property. 
 
After careful analysis we reject the cases which allow an 
award of damages in a proceeding under Rule 41(e) as we 
conclude that a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure that 
does not expressly provide for an award of monetary 
damages does not waive sovereign immunity.4 We find the 
reasoning of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in 
Pena and of the United States District Court for the District 
of New Jersey in Chambers to be persuasive on this point. 
 
The court in Pena reasoned as follows: 
 
       Pena has named the United States as the defendant in 
       his case. The principle of sovereign immunity protects 
       the federal government from suit except insofar as that 
       immunity is waived. A waiver must be unequivocally 
       expressed in statutory text and will not be implied. See 
       Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192, 116 S.Ct. 2092, 
       2096, 135 L.Ed.2d 486 (1996) (citations omitted). Rule 
       41(e) makes no provision for monetary damages, and 
       we will not read into the statute a waiver of the federal 
       government's immunity from such damages. Numerous 
       Supreme Court decisions hold that courts should 
       construe statutes against waiver unless Congress has 
       explicitly provided for it. See, e.g., Lane, 116 S.Ct. at 
       2097 (refusing to allow monetary damages under 
       S 504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 
       S 791 et seq., where the relevant statutory provisions 
       failed to provide the `clarity of expression necessary to 
       establish a waiver of the Government's sovereign 
       immunity against monetary damages'); United States v. 
       Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33-34, 112 S.Ct. 
       1011, 1014-15, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992) (holding that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The case law suggests that sovereign immunity may be waived only by 
a clear statutory expression of waiver; legislative history will not 
suffice 
to operate as a waiver. See United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 
U.S. 
at 37, 112 S.Ct. at 1016. Given our holding in this case, however, we 
need not address the broader question of whether rules of procedure, 
standing alone, can be found to constitute a waiver of sovereign 
immunity. 
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       although the contemporary S 106(c) of the Bankruptcy 
       Code waived sovereign immunity, `it fail[ed] to establish 
       unambiguously that the waiver extend[ed] to monetary 
       claims'). However compelling his case, Pena may not 
       maintain a suit against the United States for monetary 
       damages under Rule 41(e). 
 
Pena, 157 F.3d at 986. The district court in Chambers 
agreed. See Chambers, 2000 WL 369786 at *3. 
 
In this case the district court appeared to have assumed, 
and the Beins have argued, that because the courts have 
construed Rule 41(e) to grant a district court the power to 
award certain equitable relief, the court had jurisdiction to 
award complete relief, which in certain circumstances could 
include an award of monetary damages. While this line of 
reasoning may have merit in analogous situations with 
respect to a non-governmental entity, it does not properly 
address the sovereign immunity claim raised by the 
Government. In fact, the Supreme Court has found that the 
waiver of sovereign immunity does not extend beyond the 
express terms of the waiver. See Department of the Army v. 
Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 119 S.Ct. 687 (1999). 
 
In Blue Fox the respondent sued the Army under section 
702 of the Administrative Procedures Act, which provides in 
relevant part: 
 
       A person suffering legal wrong because of agency 
       action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency 
       action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is 
       entitled to judicial review thereof. An action in a court 
       of the United States seeking relief other than money 
       damages and stating a claim that an agency or an 
       officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an 
       official capacity or under color of legal authority shall 
       not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the 
       ground that it is against the United States or that the 
       United States is an indispensable party. 
 
Id. at 260, 119 S.Ct. at 691 (citing 5 U.S.C. S 702). The 
respondent asked the Court to find that the provision 
waiving sovereign immunity from actions seeking relief 
other than money damages would allow it to seek a lien on 
funds held by the United States. See id. 
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The court of appeals in Blue Fox had read an earlier 
decision of the Supreme Court as standing for the 
proposition that section 702's reference to "other than 
money damages" constituted a waiver of sovereign 
immunity as to all actions equitable in nature. See id. at 
261, 119 S.Ct. at 691. The Supreme Court disagreed, 
finding that the waiver of sovereign immunity must be 
found in the language of the statute, and thus proceeded to 
determine whether the relief sought by respondents 
constituted money damages. See id. at 261-62, 119 S.Ct. at 
691-92. The Court held that the imposition of the equitable 
lien sought by respondent was in fact a claim for money 
damages outside the waiver of sovereign immunity. See id. 
at 263, 119 S.Ct. at 692. 
 
In keeping with the reasoning of Blue Fox, to the extent 
a court may read Rule 41(e) as a waiver of sovereign 
immunity, it must limit the waiver to the express terms of 
the rule. We reiterate that Rule 41(e) provides for one 
specific remedy -- the return of property. Although courts 
treat a motion pursuant to Rule 41(e) as a civil equitable 
action, such a characterization cannot serve as the basis 
for subjecting the United States to all forms of equitable 
relief. A court must strictly construe the scope of a waiver 
of sovereign immunity in favor of the sovereign. See Blue 
Fox, 525 U.S. at 261, 119 S.Ct. at 691. The interpretation 
of Rule 41(e) urged by the Beins would apply a liberal 
construction of the scope of a waiver of sovereign immunity. 
Consequently, we conclude that the district court erred 
when it exercised subject matter jurisdiction over the Beins' 
claims for monetary damages. Therefore we will vacate the 
order of the district court of July 9, 1999, to the extent it 
awarded the Beins monetary damages and we will remand 
the matter to the district court to dismiss the Rule 41(e) 
motion, to the extent that it sought monetary damages for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
 
We believe our conclusion is buttressed by a review of the 
specific instance under the Federal Tort Claim Act ("FTCA") 
in which the Government has waived sovereign immunity in 
actions seeking damages for loss or damage to property. We 
refer to that waiver not to suggest that any particular 
remedy is, or was, available in this case, or would be 
 
                                11 
  
available in future cases involving seizure of evidence in 
criminal matters, but rather to illustrate the manner in 
which a Rule 41(e) action for damages could undermine the 
limitations set forth on the waiver of sovereign immunity in 
property loss or damages cases. 
 
While the FTCA waives sovereign immunity for certain 
claims for money damages, that waiver is subject to several 
limitations. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. S 1346(b)(1) (providing 
jurisdiction in the district courts for claims for money 
damages resulting from injury to, or loss of, property 
caused by the negligence of a Government employee). As 
particularly germane here, the waiver in section 1346(b) 
does not extend to any claim "arising in respect . . . of the 
detention of goods or merchandise by any officer of customs 
or excise or any other law-enforcement officer." 28 U.S.C. 
S 2680(c). 
 
The courts have interpreted section 2680(c) to bar claims 
premised upon essentially any injury to property sustained 
during its detention. See Kosak v. United States , 465 U.S. 
848, 853-55, 104 S.Ct. 1519, 1523-24 (1984). Further, the 
courts usually broadly interpret the term law-enforcement 
official within 2680(c). See United States v. 2,116 Boxes of 
Boned Beef, 726 F.2d 1481, 1490-91 (10th Cir. 1984) 
(USDA inspectors included); see also Halverson v. United 
States, 972 F.2d 654, 655-56 (5th Cir. 1992) (INS border 
patrol agents included); Schlaebitz v. United States Dep't. of 
Justice, 924 F.2d 193, 194 (11th Cir. 1991) (federal 
Marshals included); Ysasi v. Rivkind, 856 F.2d 1520, 1525 
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (INS border patrol agents included); 
Formula One Motors, Ltd. v. United States, 777 F.2d 822, 
823 (2nd Cir. 1985) (DEA agents included); United States v. 
Lockheed L-188 Aircraft, 656 F.2d 390, 397 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(FAA employees included); but see Bazuaye v. United 
States, 83 F.3d 482 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (postal employees not 
included); Kurinsky v. United States, 33 F.3d 594, 598 (6th 
Cir. 1994) (section 2680(c) is limited to detention of goods 
by law enforcement officers acting in tax or customs 
capacity). 
 
If a party were to proceed under the FTCA on a 
negligence theory, then his or her claim for money damages 
might be barred because the lost or damaged property was 
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detained by law-enforcement officials. Indeed, if the Beins 
had proceeded under the FTCA their action might have 
been barred on this very basis. See 28 U.S.C. S 2680(c). 
Thus, granting an award of damages under Rule 41(e) could 
allow a party to make a recovery pursuant to a procedural 
rule even though he or she would be barred from such 
recovery under a statute passed by Congress. Such a result 
would be incongruous as it would be directly contrary to 
the intent of Congress. 
 
Finally, we make reference to two of our recent cases. 
First we observe that our holding today is not inconsistent 
with our opinion in United States v. Chambers , 192 F.3d 
374. In Chambers, we were presented with the question of 
what role the district court should play when addressing a 
Rule 41(e) motion in which the Government asserts it no 
longer has possession of the property at issue. We 
concluded that in such a case 
 
       the District Court must determine, in fact, whether the 
       government retains possession of the property; if it 
       finds that the government no longer possesses the 
       property, the District Court must determine what 
       happened to the property. The District Court must hold 
       an evidentiary hearing on any disputed issue of fact 
       necessary to the resolution of the motion. 
 
       If the District Court concludes that the government's 
       actions . . . were not proper, it shall determine what 
       remedies are available. 
 
Chambers, 192 F.3d at 378 (citations omitted). We did not 
consider there whether such available remedies would 
include an award of monetary damages. See id.  Indeed, we 
never mentioned sovereign immunity in our opinion. 
Second, we note that in our en banc opinion in United 
States v. One Toshiba Color Television, Nos. 98-3578/3579, 
2000 WL 669978, at *10 (3d Cir. May 24, 2000), we 
indicated that even if an owner of property obtains an order 
vacating an order for forfeiture "that [success] does not 
mean that he is entitled to any monetary relief or relief in 
the form of a transfer of property." We, however, did not 
make a ruling on the point as we merely indicated that 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) such relief might not be 
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available. Again, as in Chambers, we did not discuss 
sovereign immunity. Thus, our opinion in One Toshiba left 




For the reasons set forth above, we find that the district 
court did not have jurisdiction over the Beins' Rule 41(e) 
motion to the extent it sought to recover damages for 
property the Government allegedly destroyed. Accordingly, 
we will vacate the order of the district court entered July 9, 
1999, and remand the matter to the district court for 
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction insofar as the motion 
sought and the order awarded monetary damages. Thus, 
the order of July 9, 1999, shall stand only with respect to 
the order to the Government to return the one cart in its 
possession. The order of August 18, 1999, will be affirmed. 
We will remand the case to the district court for entry of an 
order in accordance with this opinion. 
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